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Abstract IEEE 802.11 Wireless Networks are getting
more and more popular at university campuses, enter-
prises, shopping centers, airports and in so many other
public places, providing Internet access to a large crowd
openly and quickly. The wireless users are also getting
more dependent on WiFi technology and therefore de-
manding more reliability and higher performance for
this vital technology. However, due to unstable radio
conditions, faulty equipment, and dynamic user behav-
ior among other reasons, there are always unpredictable
performance problems in a wireless covered area. De-
tection and prediction of such problems is of great sig-
nificance to network managers if they are to alleviate
the connectivity issues of the mobile users and provide
a higher quality wireless service. This paper aims to
improve the management of the 802.11 wireless net-
works by characterizing and modeling wireless usage
patterns in a set of anomalous scenarios that can oc-
cur in such networks. We apply time-invariant (Gaus-
sian Mixture Models) and time-variant (Hidden Markov
Models) modeling approaches to a dataset generated
from a large production network and describe how we
use these models for anomaly detection. We then gen-
erate several common anomalies on a Testbed network
and evaluate the proposed anomaly detection method-
ologies in a controlled environment. The experimental
results of the Testbed show that HMM outperforms
GMM and yields a higher anomaly detection ratio and
a lower false alarm rate.
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1 Introduction
Wireless 802.11 networks are getting more and more
popular in providing Internet access for a large num-
ber of users in university campuses, enterprises, urban
areas, and many other public places. These large-scale
networks, particularly speaking of IEEE 802.11 Infras-
tructure mode, consist of basic network components:
Wireless Stations, wired stations, and the Access Points
(AP) that function as connection links between the
wired and wireless sections. The APs provide coverage
and capacity for supporting mobile clients with hetero-
geneous devices and a variety of applications. Among
the many characteristics of such large-scale network is
the transition of huge volumes of traffic as a result of in-
tensive usage from different locations all over the cover-
age area. The mobile clients demand reliable connection
and high performance in all circumstances and expect
their applications to work smoothly around the wire-
less covered field, but this is an ideal case which is not
always achievable. The wireless users, most of the time
suffer from low coverage, intermittent connectivity, au-
thentication failure, degraded performance and many
other complications originated from the unreliable na-
ture of wireless connection and dynamic usage pattern
of other users in the vicinity.
Having further explored the connectivity procedure
in wireless networks, some inherent concerns and dilem-
mas become more clear. In Wireless 802.11 networks,
mobile stations perform an active or passive scanning
process to discover available APs in the vicinity and
ar
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connect to an AP with the highest received signal strength
(RSS) [24]. This association strategy, only based on
RSS, can lead to many connectivity problems and per-
formance issues as it may result in significant load im-
balance between APs. The overloaded APs can still
present high RSS and try to accommodate more sta-
tions while other APs are only slightly loaded or even
idle. Another source of performance degradation in WLANs
is the multi-rate flexibility and the fairness mechanism
of the MAC protocol- when a station far from the AP
reduces its bit rate to avoid repeated unsuccessful frame
transmission and as a result degrades the throughput
of the other stations associated with the same AP [17].
In addition to the aforementioned problems, due to
the unreliable and time-varying nature of the wireless
channels, 802.11 networks usually suffer from many pit-
falls such as exposed and hidden terminals, capture ef-
fect, interferences, signal fading, inconsistent coverage,
and many other examples. In such circumstances, high
packet loss is observed [13]- that results in inconsistent
connectivity and low performance. Network managers
are concerned about discovering such sort of problems
and abnormal events that occur in their network. Detec-
tion of anomalies is not only advantageous for prompt-
ing immediate administrative actions but also useful for
long-term network design, planning, and maintenance
decisions as the network infrastructure and usage evolve
over time.
In large deployments of 802.11 networks with vary-
ing usage, channel conditions, and operational constraints,
network managers often demand tools that provide them
with a comprehensive view of the entire network for au-
tomatic detection of the problems. In such widespread
networks, where at any moment there is a high possi-
bility of mal-functioning of APs and user devices, the
necessity of such automatic tools or applications is vital
to preserve the quality of service at an acceptable level.
Monitoring the infrastructure by any means rather than
intelligent diagnostic tools seems inconvenient in prac-
tice or overpriced in budget. For example, it is expensive
to deploy third party devices like sensors and sniffers in-
dividually on clients machines or APs for detection of
problems in different OSI layers, as studied earlier [7,
12,25]. And it seems impractical for network staff to
walk around the wireless covered area with a device
in their hand monitoring the network and measuring
the quality of connections at any time. In this paper,
we propose an automatic diagnostic tool that analyzes
the usage data of the APs- collected from a RADIUS
authentication server. We apply probabilistic learning
algorithms to produce a model for each access point or
group of access points, and identify anomalous events
with a margin of certitude. AP usage modeling and
anomaly detection in hotspots would assist network ad-
ministrators to ensure long-term quality of service by
analyzing various connectivity factors of wireless users
in particular localities. We propose probabilistic graph-
ical model- and in particular HMM- to establish a com-
prehensive image of the evolving structure of wireless
networks, to distinguish usage behaviors in different
locations and grouping context and their correlations
and dependencies, and to represent the spatio-temporal
anomalous patterns detected in wireless networks. In
the current work we focus more on proposing individ-
ual models for APs as the ground truth data is only
available through the single AP Testbed deployment
and the multiple APs’ experiment is planned for the
future work. The prospective methodology is based on
the development of HMM models and a detection tool
using WiFi campus data; our recent contributions [9,
10] have taken this approach into account. As a prelim-
inary investigation on the subject, we focused on short
802.11 sessions recorded through RADIUS authentica-
tion as a network artifact and an indicator of quality
of wireless access [9]. In [10] an exhaustive analysis is
performed for outlier detection in 802.11 wireless net-
works using HMM variations- single HMM, mixture of
HMMs and individual HMMs- and is evaluated by the
state of the art statistical methodologies. Furthermore
a number of network anomalous patterns are repre-
sented, in the same study, considering HMM parame-
ters such as hidden states’ transition and partial likeli-
hood of the observation sequences. In the present study
we considered HMM and its counterpart time-invariant
methodology- Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM)- to in-
vestigate the temporal relevancy of the employed data,
whether a simpler time-invariant model such GMM is
adequate to detect anomalies or a more complex model
like HMM is really needed. These two methodologies
are analyzed and compared with each other both in
modeling and anomaly detection experiments.
This paper contains two main parts: 1) analysis and
modeling of 802.11 AP usage and exploring the time
dependency of the employed data, and 2) identifica-
tion and detection of different types of anomalies and
characterizing them efficiently. The aforementioned ob-
jectives are investigated on a large dataset of AP usage
and examined on a smaller scale testbed for the purpose
of evaluation.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section
2, the related work and the most recent researches rel-
evant to the current work are presented. In section 3,
the wireless setup procedure in infrastructure mode is
characterized and the key attributes and functionalities
of RADIUS protocol are defined. Section 4 deals with
the process of data accumulation as a result of wireless
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users’ association attempts, and presents a set of main
features extracted from the dataset and feature selec-
tion techniques for further analysis. Statistical model-
ing of the AP usage data, categorized as time-invariant
and time-variant approaches are provided in section 5
and a brief discussion is enclosed at the end of the sec-
tion comparing these methodologies. In section 6, we
describe how the proposed models serve to detect and
characterize different forms of anomalies. In section 7,
the experimental results are analyzed and discussed,
and the evaluation process is represented based on the
deployed testbed in a controlled environment. In section
8, the major conclusions are provided and prominent
directions for future work are identified.
2 Related Work
2.1 Wireless Measurement Tools
Several prior works are dedicated to studying the dy-
namics of wireless network behavior, as well as the per-
formance and reliability of WLAN technologies [12] [31]
[30] [20]. In [12] a system called Jigsaw is presented
which uses multiple monitors to provide a single unified
view of physical, link, network and transport-layer ac-
tivities, including inference techniques for the particular
issues of 802.11. The authors deployed an infrastructure
with over 150 radio monitors that capture 802.11b and
802.11g activities in a university building to investi-
gate the causes of performance degradation. Significant
challenges of such vast distributed monitoring system
include the necessity of hardware and software instru-
mentations on each and every monitor and the scal-
able synchronization difficulties and inaccuracies. For
this reason, most wireless management techniques avoid
broad modifications in the clients devices, sensors, snif-
fers and monitors deployed in the large wireless covered
area.
In another line of research a Passive Interference Es-
timator (PIE) is presented [31] which provides a fine-
grained estimation of link interferences in WLAN. PIE
provides an estimate of WLAN interference caused by
client mobility, dynamic traffic loads, and varying chan-
nel conditions. This work is inspired by two previous
WLAN monitoring approaches: the aforementioned Jig-
saw [12] and WIT [21]. The PIE producers use sniffing
at APs to avoid deploying additional monitors similar
to Jigsaw, but with the penalty of missing a portion of
uplink client traffics and hence uplink client conflicts.
However, they proposed an accurate approach in esti-
mating link interference by providing a conflict graph
in real time.
In a similar direction of work, fine-grained detec-
tion algorithms are proposed that are able to distin-
guish the root-causes of performance degradation at the
physical layer [30]. It is described that various faults,
such as hidden terminals, capture effects and noise,
could have the same propagation effects on the network
layer (degraded throughput) and therefore could lead to
the same remediation techniques from 802.11 (rate fall-
back), while they have completely different origins in
the physical layer. Hence, the researchers of this work
designed a unified framework for this purpose, called
MOJO, that combines the observations from multiple
distributed sniffers and diagnoses the granularity of the
root causes to suggest appropriate remedies for differ-
ent physical faults. Although the proposed framework
measures the impact of the most commonly observed
faults on different network layers, it is still a client side
monitoring system and suffers from the extensive sniffer
distribution all over the wireless covered area.
In [20], WiMed is proposed that uses only local
measurements from commodity 802.11 NICs for under-
standing how the medium is utilized, and for inspect-
ing the causes of interferences (including non-802.11 de-
vices). WiMed provides a time-domain view of how the
medium is used in a given 802.11 channel, and iden-
tify the root causes of interference using physical layer
properties such as bit error patterns and medium busy
times. The authors refrain from elaborate instrumen-
tation and dedicated infrastructure, however detectors
are only implemented for interference and contention,
and there is a higher confidence for recognition of non-
802.11 interferer rather than 802.11 sources of interfer-
ence.
All the above literatures expose the difficulties in
monitoring the wireless environment thoroughly, and
the challenges of performance estimation in such com-
plex networks. Most cases- require heavy instrumenta-
tion of the user devices and focus on specific anomalies
affecting individual users- thus neither considering us-
age trend nor location related anomalies.
2.2 Usage Modeling and Anomaly Detection
There are several lines of research that take an ap-
proach closely related to our work. In [23] AP usage
and daily keep-alive events of mobile stations in 802.11
hotspots in infrastructure mode are analyzed and mod-
eled. In this work, generative probabilistic models are
investigated such as Gamma mixture of exponentials
and Conditional probability models considering depen-
dencies between consecutive samples in time. The gen-
erative statistical models and experimental results of
this work conducted on a very similar dataset to ours
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provide some broad insight into AP usage and illustrate
those aspects of such networks that benefit our work.
In [22], a usage pattern called ”abrupt ending” is
explored in a similar dataset, and it concerns the dis-
association of a large number of wireless sessions in
the same AP within a one second window, or in a
nutshell ”simultaneous session ending”. The authors of
this work, further investigate this concept and intro-
duce some anomalous patterns that might be in cor-
relation with the occurrence of this phenomena. For
instance, they propose that interference across the AP
vicinity could be deduced when abrupt endings happen
to neighboring APs within specified time interval, or
the AP overloaded could be inferred when the contin-
ued sessions are present after abrupt endings. There are
a number of other anomalous patterns reported in this
paper such as AP halt/crash, persistence interference
and intermittent connectivity. The classification and
analysis of these anomaly-related patterns performed
in this research, inspired our work to regenerate similar
anomalies in a real Testbed to experiment and evaluate
the HMM methodologies practiced in the current study.
2.3 HMM Applications in Network Analysis
In wireless networking, HMMs are employed to address
various aspects of network measurement and analysis.
Hierarchical and Hidden Markov based techniques are
analyzed in [19] to model 802.11b MAC-to-MAC chan-
nel behavior in terms of bit error and packet loss. The
authors employed two random variables in packet loss
process, inter-arrival-rate and burst-length of packet
loss, and applied the traditional two-state Markov chain.
The results demonstrates that two-state Markov chain
provides an adequate model for the 802.11b MAC-to-
MAC packet loss process. Furthermore, in regard to bit
error modeling, three other Markov-based chains are
evaluated: full-state, hidden, and hierarchical Markov
chains. Among these chains, it is illustrated that the
full-state Markov bit error model of order 9 and above,
renders the best performance. Since the main concern
to use HMM in this example is to generate error traces,
a simple three-state HMM is designed and utilized for
one HMM solution: the adjustment of model parame-
ters to best account for the observed signal.
In a more recent line of research in [18] a multi-
level approach involving HMMs and Mixtures of Mul-
tivariate Bernoullis (MMB) is proposed to model the
long and short time scale behavior of wireless sensor
network links, that is, the binary sequence or trace of
packet receptions (1s) and losses (0s) in the link. In this
approach, HMM is applied to model the long-term evo-
lution of the trace, and the hidden states correspond to
packet reception rate. Within the aforementioned hid-
den states, the short-term evolution of the trace is mod-
eled by either another HMM or by a MMb. That is how
the multilevel, or in this case the two level approach,
is formed. The notion of multilevel HMM, or higher di-
mensional HMM, is an impressive concept regarding to
our own work, and we intend to make use of this ap-
proach to improve our HMM variations for anomalous
pattern detection in the future work.
One of the salient applications of HMMs addressed
in wireless networking is prediction. For instance in [11]
HMMs are utilized to model and predict the spectrum
occupancy of sharing radio bands. The channel status
prediction is considered as a binary series prediction
problem, as channel occupancy can be represented as
idle or busy depending on the presence or absence of
a primary user activity. An ergodic two-state discrete
HMM deals with this problem. Some other prominent
work has been done on a very similar subject in radio
spectrum sensing and status prediction using HMMs in
[8,16,32].
Furthermore, in another related work, HMMs are
applied for modeling and prediction of user movement
in wireless networks to address issues in Quality of Ser-
vice (QoS) [26]. User movement from an AP to an
adjacent AP is modeled using a second-order HMM.
Although the authors demonstrated the necessity of
using HMM instead of Markov chain model, the pro-
posed model is only practical for small wireless net-
works with a few number of APs, not huge enterprises
or widespread campuses.
As the above literatures indicate and to the best of
our knowledge, HMM related studies in wireless net-
work management are rarely used specifically in per-
formance anomaly detection.
3 Wireless Setup in Infrastructure Mode
In this section we describe how a 802.11 station asso-
ciates to an access point and how our setup authenti-
cates the user and authorizes access to the network.
3.1 Association of Wireless Station to Access Point
The process of the association of a wireless mobile sta-
tion to an AP, as it is currently implemented by most
manufacturers is described as follows: A wireless station
scans the available channels of each AP in the neigh-
borhood and listens to the beacon (passive approach) or
probe response frames (active approach). IEEE 802.11
protocol defines a number of Wi-Fi channels ranging
from 2.4 GHz to 5.9 GHz. The Wi-Fi channels that are
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Table 1 The Key Attributes of RADIUS Accounting Table
Acct-Status-Type has three values: Start, Alive and Stop. A Start record is created when a user session
begins. An Alive record is registered after each 10 or 15 minutes for the users that are still
connected. A Stop record is generated when the session ends.
Acct-Session-Id is a unique number assigned to each session to facilitate matching the Start and Stop
records in a detail file, and to eliminate duplicate records.
Acct-Session-Time records the user’s connection time in seconds. This information could be included in Alive
or Stop records.
Acct-Delay-Time is the number of seconds passed between the event and the current attempt to send the
record. The approximate time of an event can be determined by subtracting the Acct-
Delay-Time from the time of the record’s arrival on the RADIUS accounting server.
Called-Station-Id &
Calling-Station-Id
record the IP address of the AP (Called Station) and the wireless user (Calling Station)
connected to that AP.
Timestamp records the time of arrival on the RADIUS Accounting host measured in seconds since the
epoch (00:00 January 1, 1970). It provides a machine-friendly version of the logging time
at the beginning of the accounting record.
Acct-Input-Octets &
Acct-Output-Octets
records the number of bytes received (Acct-Input-Octets) and sent (Acct-Output-Octets)
during a session. These values appear in Alive or Stop records.
Acct-Input-Packets &
Acct-Output-Packets
records the number of packets received (Acct-Input-Packets) and sent (Acct-Output-
Packets) during a session. These values appear in Alive or Stop records.
the concern of this work (802.11 b/g/n) are listed in
the 2.4 GHz range and consist of one to eleven channels
(up to fourteen in some countries). The wireless station
stores the received signal strength indicator (RSSI) of
the APs in the vicinity and other relevant information
such as extended service set identification (ESSID), en-
cryption type (e.g. WPA, WEP), etc. When the scan-
ning process is over, the wireless station selects an AP
with the highest RSSI among the observed APs in its
proximity. After the process of authentication/ autho-
rization is accomplished, the permission is granted to
the wireless station and the connection is established.
Forthwith, the wireless station is associated with the
new AP and the user is ready to send and receive traffic
through that AP. The wireless station will be disasso-
ciated from the current AP under the mobility circum-
stances, AP shutdown or halt, RSSI recession or some
other normal or abnormal consequences of network fluc-
tuations. The process of AP selection only based on the
strongest RSSID lead to aforesaid load imbalance prob-
lem, while some APs are overcrowded and the other
available APs remain idle.
3.2 Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
(RADIUS)
Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS)
is a network protocol that enables remote access servers
to communicate with a central server to authenticate
dial-in users and authorize their access to the requested
system or service. RADIUS is commonly used by Inter-
net Service Providers (ISPs), cellular network providers,
and corporate and educational networks, and it allows
the management of user profiles in a central database
that all remote servers can share. Having a central ser-
vice facilitates the process of tracking usage for billing
and network statistics. RADIUS is a de facto industry
standard used by a number of network product compa-
nies and it is a proposed IETF standard . This protocol
is used to provide network authentication, authoriza-
tion, and accounting services, and it is particularly de-
scribed in Request for Comments (RFC) 2865 and RFC
2866 .
According to RADIUS protocol, whenever a client
associates to an 802.11 AP, a log event ”START” is
recorded in the accounting database. While the client
is still connected to this AP, every 10 or 15 minutes
(based on the server configuration) an interim log event
”ALIVE” is issued to refresh the connection between
the client and the AP. Eventually, when the user decides
to disconnect from the network, or for some reason it
is forced to leave the network, a log event ”STOP” is
recorded, which marks the end of the association pe-
riod of this user. Each log record includes some key
attributes of time-stamp, session ID, association dura-
tion, number of input and output packets/octets. Table
1 present a brief explanation of some of these key at-
tributes more relevant to this work.
RADIUS serves three main functionalities:
– Authenticates users before granting them access to
the network.
– Authorizes the authenticated users for specific net-
work services.
– Accounts the usage activity of the authorized users
for the services in use.
AAA stands for ”Authentication, Authorization, and
Accounting”. It defines an architecture that authenti-
cates and grants authorization to users and accounts for
6 Anisa Allahdadi, Ricardo Morla
Fig. 1 The Authentication and Authorization Process in
RADIUS
their activity. When AAA is not used, the architecture
is described as ”open”, where anyone can gain access
and do anything, without any tracking.
3.2.1 Authentication and Authorization
Authentication refers to the process of validating the
identity of the user by matching the credentials pro-
vided by the user on the AAA server. If the credentials
match, the user is authenticated and gains access to the
network. On the contrary, if the credentials mismatch,
authentication fails and network access is denied. Au-
thentication can also fail, due to user incorrectly enter-
ing the credentials. A network administrator can choose
to permit limited network access to unknown users, for
instance the guests of a conference or a temporary pub-
lic event in academic environments.
Authorization deals with the process of deciding
what permissions are granted to the user. For exam-
ple, the user may or may not be permitted certain kinds
of network access or allowed to issue certain commands.
Typically, a user login consists of a query (Access-Request)
from the NAS to the RADIUS server and the RADIUS
server either grants or denies authorization (Access-
Accept or Access-Reject) based on the information passed
by in the request query. In each case, the RADIUS
server manages the authorization policy and the NAS
enforces the policy. The process of authentication and
authorization is delineated in Figure 1.
3.2.2 Accounting
Accounting refers to the recording of resources users
consume during the time they are connected to the net-
work. The information gathered can include the total
system time used, and the amount of data sent or re-
ceived by the user during a session. Over a network
session, the NAS periodically sends an accounting data
of user activity to the server (in ”Alive” or ”Stop” ses-
sions). This data is mainly used for the billing purposes.
However, we used the accounting information for the
reason of network monitoring and management as the
log dataset is already stored in a central database, the
RADIUS server, and facilitates the data collection pro-
cess.
The detailed information of users’ activities is not
included in the summary sent by NAS- for instance the
visited web sites or particular protocols in use is local to
the NAS- and is not available to the RADIUS server.
Transactions between the client and RADIUS server
are authenticated through the use of a shared secret,
which is never sent over the network. In addition, user
passwords are sent encrypted between the client and
RADIUS server to eliminate the possibility of snooping
on an insecure network.
4 Data Description and Feature Selection
In this section we present the main dataset used in this
paper, provide some preliminary statistical analysis and
describe the key features emerge from the raw dataset
as well as the of process of feature selection for modeling
and further investigations.
4.1 Large Dataset
For the current study, we use RADIUS authentication
log data collected at the hotspot of the Faculty of Engi-
neering of the University of Porto (FEUP). The Univer-
sity hotspots are part of the Eduroam European wire-
less academic network initiative. The trace data con-
sists of the daily summary of connections between 364
APs and their corresponding wireless stations collected
in almost two years, from January 1, 2010 to Decem-
ber 22, 2011. The university campus contains over 30
buildings, including classrooms, administrative offices,
auditoriums, libraries, cafeterias, laboratories, etc. Dur-
ing the mentioned period, the usage record of more than
45 thousand users was observed through the established
connections of over 24 million sessions. Table 2 depicts
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Table 2 The semester-level evolution of hotspot usage during two years
Academic Semesters # APs # Users # Sessions Total Input Traffic
(TB)
Total Output Traffic
(TB)
Spring 10/11 238 15564 5127823 148 253
Fall 10/11 278 15614 2619497 81 138
Spring 11/12 317 20200 5879742 177 359
Fall 11/12 338 21946 7167023 91 170
(a)
(b)
Fig. 2 Number of Sessions per User (Hourly) (a) Moving Average, and (b) CDF
the evolution of the usage across the hotspot through-
out the academic semesters.
In general, an increasing trend is observed in the
number of deployed APs, number of wireless users and
overall number of RADIUS sessions (start, alive, and
stop), from semester to semester. Total input and out-
put traffic, however, fluctuate between spring and fall
semesters to some extent. Although the overall sent and
received traffic grows in volume in ultimate fall/spring
semester rather than the earlier, the wireless network
are subjected to higher traffic in spring semesters com-
pared to fall semesters.
4.2 Preliminary Data Analysis
In this section we present some extensive statistical
analysis about the entire dataset and demonstrate rele-
vant graphics revealing some general facts of underlying
usage pattern of FEUP wireless network. We conduct
this study from two peculiar viewpoint, users and the
accompanying sessions, and APs and their accommo-
dated users.
4.2.1 User Sessions
As indicated earlier, each user could connect to the
same AP more than once during the day, and each con-
nection creates a separate sessionID in the accounting
table. An ideal association to the wireless network could
last for the entire day and if the user is fixed in its lo-
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 3 Number of Sessions per User (Daily) (a) Moving Average, and (b) CDF
cation, it is expected to have the same session without
interruption. However, this is not always the case and
users disassociate from their current AP and associate
to the same AP or another AP in the vicinity for var-
ious reasons. Figure 2 considers the proportion of the
user sessions in an hourly period and Figure 3 reveals
the same information on a daily basis.
Figure 2a shows the moving average of the num-
ber of sessions that each client (device) creates during
one hour of connection. Although the majority of users
have a few number of sessions in an hour which shows
few number of disassociations, the extreme cases are
also detectable in this figure. For instance, users are ob-
served that generate over 2000 sessions on average in an
hourly connection to a single AP. To study the greatest
population of users, Cumulative Distribution Function
(CDF) of users and their containing sessions is demon-
strated in Figure 2b. This figure displays that more
than 70% of the user connections remain unbroken and
preserve a single session during the hourly association
to their affiliated AP, and over 95% of the user connec-
tions contain only 5 sessions during an hour which is
the result of intentional or unintentional disassociation
from the current AP.
Figure 3a encloses similar information as Figure 2a,
but in a daily basis. As expected, the number of disas-
sociations during one day is higher than an hour period.
Figure 3b demonstrates that extremely consistent con-
nections which hold a single session during a day, are
less than 40%. Most of such connections could be issued
from stationary idle devices in vacant locations of the
campus with few or no other active users around. This
figure also displays that about 20% of the sessions are
interrupted between 5 and 20 times a day.
4.2.2 Access Points
In this part, the study is more focused on the usage be-
havior of APs as indicators of different locations around
the university campus. Figure 4 demonstrates the aver-
age number of users and sessions per AP during the two
years of experiment for the working days only. Clearly
this statistics could differ from semester to semester as
the number of users and their corresponding sessions
evolve over time, however this figure provides a gen-
eral report of involvement of the entire set of APs in
Anomaly Detection and Modeling in 802.11 Wireless Networks 9
Fig. 4 CDF of Average Number of Users & Sessions per AP
Fig. 5 CDF of the Daily Average Connection Duration of Users per AP (min)
the wireless covered area in two years of experiment.
Figure 4 displays that around 20% of the APs contain
only 10 sessions per day and almost 45% of the APs
associate with 10 users during the day. To maintain
the steadiness of the results, the weekends are excluded
from this statistics. The figure also shows that over 95%
of the APs (345 APs) contain at most 50 users a day
and about 30% of the APs (109 APs) typically associate
with 5 users each day.
Figure 5 reveals interesting information on the du-
ration of users’ daily connections per AP. It shows that
the average connection period of users in 30% of the
time is only 10 minutes per day. This data most prob-
ably belongs to the mobile users, guests, short-term
clients or inactive users. Figure 5 also demonstrates that
around 95% of the time, users maintain their connec-
tions to APs at most for 100 minutes, less than 2 hours
a day. Such information send an important message to
the network managers of the vitality of connection per-
formance and quality of service as a great number of
the users are connected to the network for less than 2
hours a day and getting interrupted over and over again
in such a short period of time could be disappointing.
The study of the information provided in Figure 4
and 5- yields more precise understanding of the im-
portance of the APs and learning their usage pattern
based on the locations, for instance whether they are
located in a busy entrance hall or a quiet corner of the
campus. Such sort of information also imply the po-
tential categories in terms of university divisions like
administrative office, classroom, cafeteria, auditorium,
etc. Such classification plays an important role for fur-
ther analysis and modeling practices for the purpose
of anomaly detection. It brings about the question of
similarities (or differences) of the usage patterns in po-
tential groups with different population of users that
could prompt interesting anomaly detection strategies
by learning the trend of the group and detecting the un-
usual events. These lines of research are of our interest
for the future work.
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4.3 Data Features
A number of features emerge from the raw dataset as
a result of a preliminary analysis and enumeration pro-
cess on a timely basis of 15 minutes. We categorize
all the measured features as two main classes: Density
Attributes and Usage Attributes. Those features that
are indicators of density, basically demonstrate how
crowded is the place in terms of active attendant users,
when in fact the usage features disclose the volume of
sent and received traffics by the present users. The for-
mer attributes mainly characterize the association pop-
ulation and durability, and the later ones reveal the to-
tal bandwidth throughput regardless of how populous
is the place and it is more relevant to the applications
utilized by the current mobile users.
4.3.1 Density Attributes
User Count : the number of unique users observed in a
specific location (indicated by an AP) during the pre-
defined time-slot (15 min).
Session Count : the total population of active sessions
during a time-slot regardless of the owner user. This
attribute reveals the number of attempts made by the
the congregation of the present users to associate to
the current AP. The connection time span of each user
consists of one to many sessions.
Connection Duration : the total duration of association
time of all the current users. This attribute is an indi-
cator of the overall connection persistence. The utmost
amount of this features is achieved when there is no ev-
idence of disassociation in the ongoing active sessions
during a time-slot (User Count ∗ 15min).
4.3.2 Usage Attributes
Input Data in Octets : the number of octets transmit-
ted from the client and incoming to the NAS port, and
is only present in the Stop or Alive sessions. This at-
tribute briefly refers to the number of bytes uploaded
by the wireless user.
Output Data in Octets : the number of octets received
by the client and leaving the NAS port, and is only
present in the Stop or Alive sessions. This attribute
shortly refers to the number of bytes downloaded by
the wireless user.
Input Data in Packets : the number of packets trans-
mitted by the client and incoming to the NAS port.
This attribute is similar to the above Input-Octet, just
to be measured in packets instead of bytes.
Fig. 6 Correlation Matrix of the Main Data Features
Output Data in packets : the number of packets re-
ceived from the client and leaving the NAS port. This
attribute is similar to the above Output-Octet, just to
be measured in packets instead of bytes.
4.4 Feature Selection
In this section we discuss the connection and correlation
of the data features explained earlier and disclose how
to choose the best set of features for further analysis.
Figure 6 depicts the correlation matrix of all the
above features. There is a high correlation observed be-
tween User Count and Session Count, on the grounds
that the number of sessions are always equal or higher
than the number of users in a time-slot. Duration do
not have a strong correlation with any of the mentioned
features, neither with Density Attributes, nor with Us-
age Attributes.
Having considered the input and output traffic trans-
ferred in octets, there is no significant correlation be-
tween these two compared to Input and output data
in packets. However there is a slightly noticeable cor-
relation between Output Octets and its corresponding
attribute Output Packets, as well as Input Octets and
Input Packets. Although there is a slight correlation
between input/output data in octets and in packets,
we consider them as semi-independent variables and in-
clude both of them in our further experiments. The in-
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Fig. 7 The Behavior of the Main Features Relative to the Three Principal Components
formation added to the system through input and out-
put traffic in octets simply take into account all the sent
and received data in bytes. However, the input and out-
put traffic measured in packets, could bring other types
of information as the packets’ size could differ by var-
ious factors such as application types and communica-
tion protocols.
For subsequent analysis and modeling procedures,
we favor using less features rather than the entire set
of attributes introduced earlier. For this reason, we ap-
plied Principal Component Analysis (PCA) technique
to find the combination of the variables which best ex-
plain the phenomena and contain the greatest part of
the entire information.
In this case the first three principal components
bring the cumulative proportion of variance to over
95%. Figure 7 demonstrates the participation propor-
tion of each feature to the principal components. From
an analysis of this Figure we conclude that the first
principal component is associated with all the above
features in a positive manner, more specifically with
the usage attributes. The second principal component
is declined towards the density attributes, increasing
with the larger density values and yet decreasing with
the larger usage values. The single largest contributor
to the third principal component is the input data in
octet or the amount of uploaded bytes by the wireless
users. The other features play less important roles in
the third component, positively or negatively. Approx-
imately categorizing the principal components like so,
provides us with a deeper understanding of the connec-
tion of the aforementioned features, density or usage
attributes, with the emanate best features resulted by
PCA technique.
4.5 Conclusions
In this section we introduced collected RADIUS data
from FEUP hotspot as the main dataset of this work
and performed a preliminary analysis from two points
of view- user sessions and access point- to demonstrate
the situation of the data respecting the hourly and daily
sessions per user as well as the user population and con-
nection duration per AP. Moreover we presented two
main groups of features- usage attributes and density
attributes- and defined a number of features for each
group. We further studied the connection and correla-
tion of the data features and selected the best combina-
tion of those features applying PCA. In the upcoming
section we show how to model the AP usage data using
the selected features represented in this section.
5 Statistical Modeling of 802.11 AP Usage
In this section we introduce statistical techniques for
modeling purposes and in the upcoming section we in-
dicate how to apply these models for anomaly detection.
The modeling approach itself can be used in distinct di-
rections such as to study the similarities and differences
of the locations, to categorize the localities in terms of
functionality (e.g. classroom, office, library) or specifi-
cation (homogeneous/heterogeneous daily, seasonal or
constant usage). We introduce time-invariant and time-
variant models and in each case we show how to apply
the model on the large dataset previously elaborated.
5.1 Time-invariant Modeling
We first consider models that assume there is no time
binding between consecutive daily events. Although this
might not be precisely the case, it yields simpler model-
ing approach. Later in the paper we compare this type
of modeling with others that do consider dependency
between consecutive daily events.
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5.1.1 Gaussian Mixture Model
We begin our modeling efforts by applying techniques
that assume all daily events come from the same dis-
tribution, regardless of any time dependency between
the consecutive records. To explain this, we pick Gaus-
sian Mixture Model (GMM), a probabilistic model that
presume all the data points are generated from a mix-
ture of a finite number of Gaussian distribution with
unknown parameters. The Expectation Maximization
(EM) procedure is the optimization technique utilized
to fit the unknown parameters and incorporate infor-
mation about the covariance structure of the data as
well as the centers of the latent Gaussians [28].
p(x|λ) =
M∑
k=1
ωk g(x|µk, Σk) (1)
where x is a D-dimensional continuous-valued data
vector (of features), wk, k = 1, ...,M , are the mixture
weights, and g(x|µk, Σk), k = 1, ...,M , are the compo-
nent Gaussian densities. Each component density is a
D-variate Gaussian function of the following form,
g(x|µk, Σk) =
exp{− 12 (x− µk)′Σ−1k (x− µk)}
(2pi)D/2|Σk|1/2 (2)
with mean vector µk and covariance matrix Σk .The
mixture weights satisfy the constraint that
∑M
k=1 ωk =
1.
The complete Gaussian mixture model is parame-
terized by the mean vectors, covariance matrices and
mixture weights from all component densities. These
parameters are collectively represented by the follow-
ing notation,
λ = {ωk, µk, Σk} k = 1, ...,M (3)
5.1.2 GMM Application: Case Study
GMM could be applied to our data features in sev-
eral ways, for instance a single mixture model for the
entire set of data, or a mixture model for each loca-
tion separately. The later approach is closer to our goal
of proposing practical models for each place indicated
by an AP (or a broader neighborhood) to explore the
characteristics of that place, and ultimately discover-
ing the abnormal behaviors occurring in contrast with
the expected usage pattern. Note that in our previous
work [10] we modeled and identified the anomalies of
three categories: of a single model for all APs, a mix-
ture model for groups of APs and individual models for
each AP. In this work we study the individual model
to be able to evaluate it with our deployed testbed and
in the future work we intend to explore the models for
the potential groups of APs.
In order to investigate the modeling capacities of
GMM for the mentioned aims, we select two different
spots to be our test cases: a highly crowded AP at the
computer service section with 3726 observed users, and
a less crowded AP in the chemical engineering depart-
ment with overall 175 users. The experiment takes into
consideration the second semester period of 2011 from
February to July. To achieve more precise result, we fo-
cus on the working daily pattern, hence the data records
belong to the working days (from Monday to Friday)
and the working hours (8 a.m. to 6 p.m.).
On each location, GMM fits are computed with three
mixture components. The Gaussian density parameters
(mean and covariance matrix) are depicted in Figure 8,
the first row belongs to the crowded AP and the second
row shows the density parameters of the less crowded
AP. In order to facilitate the visual perception and to
have an easier comparison, the density parameters are
illustrated in 2D, despite the fact that GMM process is
conducted on 3 features (principal components).
The data is standardized on each column to have
zero mean and one standard deviation, so the density
values are not appropriate to be compared with each
other directly. However, the contour lines show the di-
versity of the data points in each mixture component
and the direction of spread as well as the mass center.
The R value on each plot represents the correlation be-
tween the X and Y axis, correspondingly the first two
principal components.
Each location is characterized in this manner and
according to GMM modeling approach,
λ1 = {ωi1, µi1, Σi1} i = 1, ..., 3
and
λ2 = {ωj2, µj2, Σj2} j = 1, ..., 3
represent the mixture weights and density parame-
ters of the first and the second APs respectively.
5.2 Time-variant Modeling
In this section we consider models that assume time de-
pendency between consecutive daily events. In this case
the sequences of data records matter and they form sig-
nificant connections in a meaningful context or profile.
In time-variant models in general, conditional probabil-
ities for events are determined based on the history of
the events. In the following section we study the Hidden
Markov Models for modeling the time-varying sequen-
tial data for the ultimate purpose of anomalous pattern
recognition which we discuss more in detail in the next
section.
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Fig. 8 Density Parameters of Three Gaussian Mixture Components of the Selected APs. a Crowded AP, b Less Crowded AP
5.2.1 Hidden Markov Model
HMMs are generally used for the stochastic modeling of
non-stationary time-series. HMMs provide a high level
of flexibility for modeling and analyzing time-varying
processes or sequential data. Their particular applica-
tion is in recognition such as speech recognition, ac-
tivity recognition, gene prediction, etc. where data in-
stances are represented as a timely sequence of esti-
mates. In the current research we propose how to use
HMMs for modeling and anomaly detection purposes
in wireless networks which has never been investigated
before to the best of our knowledge.
Rabiner and Juang [27] presented a comprehensive
tutorial on HMM which provides a profound under-
standing of the basic blocks of HMM. HMM symbol-
izes a doubly stochastic process with a set of observable
states and a series of hidden states which can only be
observed through the observable set of stochastic pro-
cess. The goal in HMM is recovering a data sequence
that is not immediately observable through the other
set of observable data.
The formal definition of a n-state HMM notation is
determined as follows:
– A set of hidden states S = {si} , 1 ≤ i ≤ n
– A set of possible symbol observations in discrete
models V = {vi} , 1 ≤ i ≤ m
– State transition probability distribution (transition
matrix) A = {ai,j} , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n , ai,j = P (sj at
t+ 1|si at t)
– Observation symbol probability distributions (emis-
sion matrix), B = {bj(k)} , 1 ≤ k ≤ m , bj(k) =
P (vk at t|sj at t)
– Initial state distribution pi = {pii}, 1 ≤ i ≤ n ,
pii = P (si at t = 1)
– m = number of observation symbols in discrete mod-
els
– n = number of hidden states
The set λ = (A,B, pi) completely defines an HMM
[27]. However, in continuous emissions, instead of hav-
ing m outcomes for the observations, distribution pa-
rameters such as mean and covariance are determined.
In such cases a model is represented as λ = (A,µ,Σ, pi),
and µ and Σ stand for mean vector and covariance ma-
trix respectively.
Using the model λ, an observation sequence O =
o1, o2, ..., oT is generated as follows:
1. Select an initial state, s1, according to the initial
state probability distribution, pi;
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Fig. 9 Density Parameters of Three Hidden State in HMM of the Selected APs. a Crowded AP, b Less Crowded AP
2. Set t = 1;
3. Choose ot according to observation probability dis-
tribution in state st, bst(k);
4. Choose st+1 according to the state transition prob-
ability distribution for state st, ast,st+1
5. Set t = t + 1; return to step 3 and continue until
t > T
Given the form of the HMM, there are three key
problems of interest that solving them promotes mod-
eling the real world applications. These problems are
listed as the following [27]:
Problem 1 – Given the observation sequence O =
o1, o2, ..., oT and the model λ = (A,B, pi), how we com-
pute P (O|λ), the probability of the observation sequence.
Problem 2 – Given the observation sequence O =
o1, o2, ..., oT , how we choose a state sequence S = s1, s2,
..., sT which is optimal in some meaningful sense.
Problem 3 – How we adjust the model parameters
λ = (A,B, pi) to maximize P (O|λ).
According to our data set, the HMMs form obser-
vations with continuous multivariate Gaussian distribu-
tion, hence the emission matrix B is defined by the dis-
tribution parameters associated with the set of states.
In the proposed model, the HMMs contain fully con-
nected states, thus transitions are allowed from any
state to any other state.
5.2.2 HMM Application: Case Study
In this section we select the very same APs as in the
GMM case study (Section 5.1.2), and build HMM mod-
els for each of them separately. Our focus is once more
on the working daily pattern in the second semester of
2011, from Monday to Friday in the working hours.
As described earlier, we consider fully connected
HMMs (ergodic model) with continuous Gaussian dis-
tribution as the emission probabilities and 3 hidden
states. The states are initialized randomly, and the num-
ber of states is selected heuristically based on the best
practice of the experiments conducted on both the large
dataset and the Testbed dataset. For the multivariate
Gaussian distribution of the observations, each compo-
nent of the mean vector is uniformly drawn between
µ− 3σ and µ+ 3σ and the initial covariance matrix is
diagonal and each initial variance is uniformly drawn
between 12σ
2 and 3σ2. The initial probability matrix
(pi) and the transition matrix (A) are uniformly drawn.
The initial HMM is then optimized with the Baum-
Welch algorithm with the cut off likelihood value of
Anomaly Detection and Modeling in 802.11 Wireless Networks 15
1e− 6 or the maximum number of iterations set to 20.
After the optimization process, the physical meaning
of the hidden states are more discernible. The values of
the principal components in each state shows the ten-
dency of the states to the usage or density attributes.
For example a hidden state with the highest value for
the second principal component shows a more popu-
lated case in terms of users or sessions density. In the
future work where the concern is more on modeling the
anomalous patterns we utilize the interpretation of the
hidden states to relate them to the physical conditions
of the locations.
The Gaussian density parameters of the three hid-
den stated are illustrated in Figure 9, similar to Figure
8, the first row is affiliated with the crowded AP and
the second row belongs to the less crowded AP. The
contour lines in these two figures represent the overall
picture of the population and density distribution of
the data in each component or state. Suchlike graphs
are visual aids to depict the density parameters only,
and for inspecting the goodness of distribution over the
entire feature set and make any comparison, further in-
vestigations are required.
5.3 Model Comparison: GMM vs. HMM
In this section two techniques are considered only for
the sake of modeling purposes, a time-invariant model
(GMM) and a time-variant model (HMM). In the com-
ing section we investigate the ultimate goal of this mod-
eling which is the recognition of anomalous points or
regions. At this stage, before exploring the anomaly de-
tection territory, we briefly itemize the modeling func-
tionalities and propose some simple tests to verify the
more qualified model.
The potential functionalities of the locations char-
acterization and modeling are listed as following:
– Classification of the locations, represented by APs,
in terms of utility and temporal patterns.
– Recognition of the meaningful similarities and dis-
tinction of the locations.
– Grouping the most related APs and propose mix-
ture models for the groups [10].
To investigate the competency of the two proposed
models and estimate the capacity of each, we conduct
a simple test. First of all, we measure the log-likelihood
of the models in modeling the training data of the two
samples, crowded AP and less crowded AP, and then
we select a random day from each AP and calculate
the log-likelihood of the models towards the test data
which is new to both models. We use log-likelihood val-
ues (LLV) to measure the goodness of fit of our models.
The model with larger log-likelihood value surpasses the
model with smaller log-likelihood value.
Given data x with independent multivariate obser-
vations x1, ..., xn, the likelihood of a Gaussian mixture
model with M components is defined as [14]:
likelihood(x|λ) =
n∏
i=1
M∑
k=1
ωk g(xi|µk, Σk) (4)
where g(x|µk, Σk) is the kth component’s Gaussian
density, as already defined in Equation 1, and ωk is
the probability that an observation belongs to the kth
component.
The log-likelihood function takes the following form:
log-likelihood(x|λ) =
n∑
i=1
log(
M∑
k=1
ωk g(xi|µk, Σk)) (5)
In the EM process, the parameters of the GMM,
λ, are estimated so that the likelihood of the GMM
given the training data is maximized, Maximum Like-
lihood Estimation (MLE). Ensuing several iterations,
the MLE yields the likelihood of the GMM given the
training data. We applied MClust R package [15] to
conform the Gaussian mixture components and esti-
mate the log-likelihood of the training and test data
provided in Table 3.
The likelihood of a HMM is basically the first key
problem of HMMs stated earlier, the probability of an
observation sequence given the model parameters:
P (O|λ) =
∑
all S
P (O|S, λ)P (S|λ)
=
∑
s1,s2,...sT
pis1bs1(O1)as1,s2bs2(O2)...asT−1,sTbsT(OT)
(6)
We utilized GHMM library [29] for the formation of
HMMs, estimation of log-likelihoods and all the other
requisites of the experiments performed in this work.
Table 3 contains the log-likelihood values of the trained
GMM and HMM models for the selected APs, regard-
ing both the training and test data. Comparing the
log-likelihood values of the training data, HMM pro-
vides higher values (less negative) both for the crowded
AP and the less crowded AP. Note that the training
data contains 25 days data and the test data consists
of only one day data selected randomly from the un-
observed days. Concerning the test data, it is expected
that the selected day from the same AP obtains higher
log-likelihood value rather than the data from another
AP due to the possible similarity of daily usage in a
specified location. The first GMM (built over the crowded
AP data) provides the same amount of log-likelihood
for both test data, thus yields no distinction for its
own usage pattern rather than the other AP. However,
the second GMM (trained with the less crowded AP
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Table 3 Log-likelihood Values (LLVs) of the Training and Test Data Belong to the Selected APs for GMM and HMM Models
````````````````
Test Data LLVs
Trained Model GMM
Crowded AP
GMM
Less Crowded AP
HMM
Crowded AP
HMM
Less Crowded AP
The same train data -3468 -2154 -2553 -2131
Test data from the crowded AP -189 -189 -134 -209
Test data from the less crowded AP -509 -95 -195 -115
data) provides higher log-likelihood value for its own
data rather than the other AP.
HMMs, on the other hand, provide higher amount
of log-likelihood for their own test data rather than the
other AP, which shows the better matched model for
self data. Both GMM and HMM models for the crowded
AP provide close values of log-likelihood for the test
data, so the models do not seem to be very robust in
distinguishing between its own data and the other AP.
Howbeit, GMM and HMM models for the less crowded
AP achieve higher log-likelihood values for the training
data rather than the models of the crowded AP. It must
be considered that the test data is selected randomly
and the pattern of the selected day is not determined
in terms of normal or abnormal usage, nevertheless the
overall outcome of HMM models looks more satisfying
compared with GMM. In Section 7, the experiments
are conducted on the testbed dataset with recognized
anomalies so that the conclusion will be based on the
known ground truth. In the next section, we investi-
gate the time-variant specifications of HMMs towards
the simplicity of the time-independent GMM concern-
ing the anomaly detection objectives.
5.4 Conclusions
In this section we presented GMM as time-invariant
and HMM as time-variant modeling techniques. As a
case study for each approach we selected two different
locations in the university campus- a highly crowded
AP and a less crowded AP- and applied the forenamed
methodologies. We then defined the log-likelihood for
each method separately to examine the goodness of fit
for the proposed models in terms of train and test data.
Having conducted a simple experiment on the selected
APs revealed that HMMs are more likely to provide a
robust model to distinguish between their own pattern
and an unfamiliar pattern. In the following section we
show the functionality of the proposed models to detect
anomalous cases in AP usage data.
6 Detection of Anomalies in AP Usage Data
In this section we show how the aforementioned mod-
els are utilized for the purpose of anomaly detection.
We further explore the capabilities of these models in
recognition of abnormal events and series of unexpected
occurrences.
6.1 Anomaly Detection Approach
Network administrators are generally concerned with
anomaly detection as well as prediction. These two im-
portant tasks enable them not only to make immediate
decisions to alleviate the complications of the network,
but also to establish longstanding plans to support the
expansion of the network and its dynamic usage over
time.
6.1.1 GMM Estimation: Divergence from the Gaussian
Densities
The most generic definition of the anomalies asserts
those points or small regions isolated from the normal
zones which contain the majority of the observations.
Thus, a straightforward approach to detect anomalies,
when there is no ground truth available, is to define the
normal zones and distinguish those rare observations
which hardly belong to those normal sectors.
In GMM, the time-invariant model discussed ear-
lier, a number of Gaussian mixture components are de-
termined and each component contains normal density
parameters. The model is built based on several train-
ing data and the newly arrived records are inclined to
the most compatible component with the least distance.
Hence, to detect abnormal points we need to estimate
the affinity degree of each point, as already described
in Equation 4, and mark outliers as having the slightest
probability of belonging to any cluster.
6.1.2 HMM Estimation: Likelihood Series
HMM, as a time-variant model, considers the temporal
dependency between consecutive data records. Calcu-
lating the log-likelihood of a single data point or a series
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of sequential data points as already expressed in Equa-
tion 6, emanates the mis-behaving records comparing
to the log-likelihoods of the norm of the data. The un-
expected low values for the log-likelihood in HMM are
generally due to one or some of the following arguments:
Divergence from the Assigned Hidden State: Given an
HMM model λ and an observation sequence of O =
o1, o2, ..., oT , the most probable set of states are gener-
ated by Viterbi algorithm as S = s1, s2, ..., sT , si ∈ S.
To estimate the distance of a data point in time t to
its counterpart HMM state (st) in Viterbi path, the
Mahalanobis distance is evaluated between time-series
elements and the hidden states. Consequently the out-
liers which display the unreasonable distance to their
assigned hidden states, are highlighted to potentially
have a poor value in the likelihood series. This approach
is approximately similar to the outlier detection tech-
nique addressed earlier for GMM components.
Less Likely State Transition: According to the third
well-known HMM problem, stated in Section 5.2.1, when
a HMM model is trained the model parameters are ad-
justed to maximize the probability of the observed data
P (O|λ). The transition probability matrix is one of the
salient components of the trained model. The highest
transition probabilities are frequently observed between
identical states (si to si), while the lowest probabilities
often occur between the most distant states. However,
regardless of the form of the transition matrix, in the
Viterbi sequence outcome, it is expected to observe the
transition probabilities proportional to the values of the
transition matrix. Whenever this principal is violated
there exist an anomaly prospect. For instance if in a
Viterbi path the transition from state si to state sj
occurs only once (out of 60 transitions), and the transi-
tion probability of ai,j is 30% in the transition matrix,
this circumstance sounds unlikely and thus an anomaly-
prone transition.
6.1.3 Anomaly Detection: Case Study
In this section we explore the addressed methodologies
to detect anomalous data points or data sequences in
the same two APs that we proposed GMM and HMM
models for their corresponding training data. Figure 10
highlights the outliers of the one day test data detected
by measuring the largest distance from the Gaussian
components. The result of the first AP (crowded AP) is
displayed in blue and the second AP (less crowded AP)
is demonstrated in green. Two data points are marked
in red that both belong to the first model of the crowded
Fig. 10 GMM Estimation of Anomalous Data Points Based
on the Largest Distance from the Assigned Gaussian Compo-
nent
Fig. 11 HMM Estimation of Anomalous Data Points Based
on the Lowest Log-likelihood
AP. These outliers are appointed to a Gaussian com-
ponent of the first model, but with the lowest proba-
bility (less than 60%). Here we selected the normality
threshold to be 60%, however it could differ from model
to model and the most appropriate value of threshold
could eventually be decided by the network manager.
Figure 11 displays the anomalous points detected by
HMM based on the lowest value of the log-likelihood.
In this approach, two different data points are marked
as outliers which belong to the first AP training data,
the crowded AP. The cut-off value is considered to be
log-likelihoods below -100, note that this value could
also be configured. The more strict cut-off value yields
higher false positive rate. We investigated the likely ori-
gins of the outliers emerged in this case and we ob-
served that the Mahalanobis distance of the marked
data points are maximal with the assigned hidden state
in the Viterbi path. That must have caused the low log-
likelihood value in the likelihood series. Further exper-
iments on anomaly detection by HMMs and evaluation
techniques are performed in our previous work in [10].
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However, in this case study we demonstrated how
the anomaly detection analysis work in our proposed
framework. In the next section, we evaluate both mod-
els based on the achieved results of the deployed testbed,
hence we can determine with more confidence which
points are detected correctly.
6.2 Conclusions
In this section we described the anomaly detection tech-
niques by GMM and HMM. In GMM we define anoma-
lies as the distant data points that hardly belong to
any Gaussian component, while in HMM anomalies are
the data points with the minimum likelihood value. As
discussed more in detail in our previous work [10], we
analyzed the root cause of the low likelihood value as
divergence from the assigned hidden states as well as
the low probability in state transition. We further ex-
plored the addressed methodologies to detect anomalies
at the same APs from the previous section. We justified
the detected anomalous points, however in absence of
the ground truth in the large dataset it was not possible
to throughly evaluate the anomalous points and we left
the evaluation process for the next section.
7 Experimental Setup
In order to validate anomaly detection techniques pro-
posed in this work we deployed an exploratory testbed
with one single AP and generate a number of anomalies
in a controlled environment for experimental purposes.
We work with FreeRADIUS server which is widely used
for Enterprise Wi-Fi and IEEE 802.1X network security
and communication, particularly in the academic com-
munity, including Eduroam [1]. The very basic aspects
of our testbed dataset is elaborated in the following
section.
7.1 Server Configurations and Users Specifications
The set up process of the FreeRADIUS server is per-
formed on a Linux machine with 2.30 GHz Intel(R)
Core(TM) i5-2410M CPU, and 8GiB System Memory.
The database system used to store primary configura-
tions and AAA information is MySQL and consist of 10
preordained tables. The principal tables employed for
data collection and analysis are labeled as radcheck (au-
thentication), radpostauth (authorization) and radacct
(accounting). Other essential configurations are con-
ducted directly on FreeRADIUS setting files, such as
server and client security configurations, required cer-
tificates, database setups, and so forth.
As stated earlier, the testbed deployed for this study
is dedicated to one-AP-many-users. Thus, we describe
the AP configurations and wireless users specifications
in the following lines. The AP is an enhanced 802.11g
wireless access point powered by D-Link 108G technol-
ogy, DWL-2100AP, and supports WPA and WPA2 se-
curity protocols. The wireless users connected to this
network during one month of experiment consist of two
laptops, two smart phones, and two tablets. A sum-
mary of the users’ specifications in terms of devices,
operating systems and participation time in the experi-
ment is provided in Table 4. Obviously not all the users
were present everyday and every hour of the test, but
they follow a natural form of entering and exiting the
network. Some devices were disassociated from the net-
work when the users simply depart from the coverage
area and others were deliberately disconnected in the
time of specific anomaly generation. In the coming sec-
tions we present all types of anomalies generated and
organized for this testbed.
Table 4 A summary of the testbed users’ specifications
Device OS Participation
Time (%)
Surface Pro II Win 10 100%
Asus Win XP 100%
Alcatel onetouch Andriod 85%
iPhone iOS 15%
iPad iOS 100%
Dell Win 10 8%
7.2 Network Anomaly Generation in a Controlled
Environment
In this section we describe how some of the known wire-
less network issues are re-generated to make the desired
data records for the evaluation of the proposed meth-
ods in this work. In the time of experiment not all days
encounters anomalies, some days simply end as NOR-
MAL days and the users’ connection and amount of net-
work usage are according to the users’ usual plan of the
day. In ABNORMAL days, however, one or some kind
of anomalies are provoked to test the behavior of the
model under abnormal circumstances. The anomalous
patterns selected for this purpose are common cases
occur in real networks relatively often and affect the
performance of users connection and availability of the
network. Succeeding paragraphs deal with the specific
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aspects of these anomalies and point out how to repli-
cate them.
7.2.1 AP Shutdown/Halt
To reproduce this anomalous effect, when there is no
session recorded in the accounting table, the AP could
be shutdown for a while or restarted. This anomaly is
regenerated under various circumstances and for dif-
ferent period of time and in the real world could be
considered as AP shutdown, halt, crash or power off.
7.2.2 Heavy Usage
Single User This anomaly arises when only one user
performs heavy download or upload. It might affect the
rest of the associated users depending on the amount
of usage, duration, time of the day and other relevant
factors.
Multiple Users This anomaly emerges when more than
one user use the network excessively, and therefore the
overall throughput of the network intensifies. This could
occur in a NORMAL day or as an anomalous event and
the network tolerance, as expected, varies for different
networks and different AP configurations. In any case,
the proposed model is expected to detect the irregular-
ity and report the level of hazard so that the network
managers could take control of the situation and make
required changes if possible.
7.2.3 Wireless Network Interference
In a real network, a variety of things can interfere with
the radio waves, degrading the quality of connection
and decreasing the network reliability. Sources of in-
terference are commonly from other wireless networks
in the vicinity when they all locate in the same chan-
nel, from non-802.11 devices such as microwave ovens
or cordless phones that use 2.4GHz band as well, from
other clients in a crowded environment when they all
try to transfer data at the same time, and from RF
effects such as hidden terminals or capture effects. In
this work we intend to cause interference anomaly in
a systematic and controlled manner. For this aim, we
made use of a python script named wifijammer [6] to
intentionally jam wireless clients or APs in the range
to simulate the same outcome as the aforementioned
interferences. The jamming process works by sending
1 de-authentication packet to the client from the AP,
1 de-auth to the AP from the client, and 1 de-auth
to the AP destined for the broadcast address to de-
authenticate all clients connected to the AP. Many APs,
however, ignore de-auth to broadcast addresses. We em-
ployed wifijammer in the following plans by applying
peculiar properties each time to create different forms
of interferences.
Jamming the Entire Channel In this practice, the mon-
itor mode interface is set to listen and de-authenticate
clients or APs on a specific channel. This way of jam-
ming influence all the available networks on the current
channel and imply interferences caused by busy chan-
nels.
Jamming Clients with Various Time Intervals Execut-
ing the De-authentication procedure with short time in-
tervals hinder clients from recovering and disable them
for the entire period of jamming, so the immediate re-
sult in the accounting table is the one-time stop ses-
sion from each client and then a silent period without
any start session. While de-authenticating with a larger
time interval makes clients reclaim and try to get back
the connection to the AP, and subsequently many short
sessions is observed in the accounting table because
they are de-authenticated right after getting connected
again. In such manner we can replicate two interference
cases observed in the real datasets frequently.
Jamming Specific Clients De-authenticating some spe-
cific clients and not the rest, resembles the hidden-
terminal situation, when one client is forced to back-
off and delay data transfer because the other clients
can not sense its send-request. Depending on the time
interval discussed earlier, the sessions outcome in the
accounting table could be different.
7.3 Testbed Experimental Results
The testbed experiment is deployed in a home envi-
ronment, with a single AP and 6 regular users and be-
tween 3-4 guest users. The experiment contains 5 weeks
of data, 30 working days, and is performed in two dif-
ferent time span, once in November 2015 and a while
later in April 2016. There exist 20 normal days with no
anomalies provoked, and 10 abnormal days containing
at least one anomalous event a day. Each anomaly takes
from 15 minutes to around an hour.
In the following paragraphs we show how the mod-
eling and anomaly detection techniques operate in the
presence of the ground truth, data obtained from the
testbed deployment.
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Fig. 12 Likelihood values of the training and test data be-
long to Testbed for GMM Model
Fig. 13 Likelihood values of the training and test data be-
long to Testbed for HMM model
7.3.1 GMM vs. HMM Modeling: Pros and Cons
For the first experiment, a GMM model is built with 10
randomly selected normal days as training data. From
then on, the likelihood of the generated model is com-
puted against the training data as well as 10 unobserved
normal days and 10 abnormal days as test data. The
same process is performed on the HMM model, with
the same set of training and test data. The summary
of this experiment is displayed in Figure 12 and 13.
Both figures demonstrate overall higher likelihood
values for the training data. The likelihood values of the
unobserved data set is divided into normal and abnor-
mal outputs which are displayed in graphs with differ-
ent colors and shapes. In both models there are higher
likelihood values for the normal days rather than the
abnormal days. However, there is a discernible bound-
ary between the normal and abnormal results in HMM
while in GMM the likelihood values are not clearly sep-
arated and there are even some instances that the like-
lihood value of the normal day is lower than the ab-
normal day. The daily likelihood of abnormal days are
apparently lower than the normal days, and this value
varies with the number of abnormal occurrences and
duration of each event. However, it is more straightfor-
ward to define a threshold for HMM rather than GMM
model, to announce a day normal or abnormal.
7.3.2 Anomaly Detection
In this section we determine the anomalous time-slots
with the proposed methodologies and compare the achieved
results from the model with the testbed anomalous ranges
recorded for the abnormal instances. Note that various
thresholds for each technique produce different results
as the detection and false positive rates change based
on the selected threshold. We made use of some sta-
tistical metrics to measure the detection accuracy and
false alarms such as fall-out or false positive rate (FPR),
specificity (SPC) or true negative rate (TNR), sensitiv-
ity or true positive rate (TPR), and eventually accuracy
(ACC) and F1 score. In order to acquire the specific
definition of each terminology refer to [5].
The summary of the analysis on the normal and
anomalous test data are presented in Table 5 for GMM
modeling and in Table 6 for HMM modeling approaches.
Table 5 shows that higher thresholds increase the
possibility of anomaly detection (24.9% rather than 4.7%),
however the false positive rates also increase accord-
ingly (19% rather than 9.9% and 3%). In normal test
data, when we expect no anomalies to occur, from 2.5%
to 10.5% fall-out is observed. Comparing this fall-out
ratio to the results of Table 6 for normal test set, it
is noted that much lower false alarms is marked for
HMM (from 0.5% to 3.75%). Furthermore, the FPR for
the anomalous data in HMM is quite trivial relative to
GMM FPR output (1.1% in HMM vs. 19% in GMM).
The highest detection rate or TPR in HMM modeling
is achieved with Threshold equals to -10 which is 75%
in average for 10 abnormal days of the experiment.
Regarding the FPR or fall-out ratio recorded for
normal data in HMM, a careful consideration on each
false alarm is performed and it is noted that the HMM
model is slightly sensitive to extreme download ratio
and in some cases both download and upload volumes.
As the testbed is deployed in a real home environ-
ment with real wireless users, although in normal days
no anomaly is generated deliberately, there might have
been some evidences of rather high download or upload
by the users as it happens quite often in every wireless
network. Therefore the false positive examples occurred
in normal days could be introduced as real anomalies
appearing in normal days, however for this experiment
we assumed that normal days contain no anomalies. In
our future work we intend to propose an unsupervised
anomaly detection algorithm that detect anomalies in
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Table 5 Anomaly detection of the normal and anomalous test data belong to Testbed for GMM
````````````````Data - Threshold
Statistical Metrics
False Positive Rate
(FPR)
True Negative Rate
(TNR)
True Positive Rate
(TPR)
Accuracy
(ACC)
F1 Score
Normal Testset (Threshold: 0.6) 2.5% 97.5% 0% 97.5% 0%
Normal Testset (Threshold: 0.7) 5.5% 94.5% 0% 94.5% 0%
Normal Testset (Threshold: 0.8) 10.5% 89.5% 0% 89.5% 0%
Anomalous Testset (Threshold: 0.6) 3% 97% 4.7% 81% 8.1%
Anomalous Testset (Threshold: 0.7) 9.9% 1.01% 4.7% 75% 7.2%
Anomalous Testset (Threshold: 0.8) 19% 81% 24.9% 70% 20.75%
Table 6 Anomaly detection of the normal and anomalous test data belong to Testbed for HMM
````````````````Data - Threshold
Statistical Metrics
False Positive Rate
(FPR)
True Negative Rate
(TNR)
True Positive Rate
(TPR)
Accuracy
(ACC)
F1 Score
Normal Testset (Threshold: -50) 0.5% 99.5% 0% 99.5% 0%
Normal Testset (Threshold: -20) 1.75% 98.25% 0% 98% 0%
Normal Testset (Threshold: -10) 3.75% 96.25% 0% 96% 0%
Anomalous Testset (Threshold: -50) 0% 100% 39% 90% 49%
Anomalous Testset (Threshold: -20) 0% 100% 43% 91% 52%
Anomalous Testset (Threshold: -10) 1.1% 98.9% 75% 95% 74%
Table 7 Detection rate of various anomalous patterns of the Testbed
````````````````Model
Anomalous Patterns
Jamming Channel
(Low Intervals)
Jamming Channel
(High Intervals)
Heavy Usage
(Single User)
Heavy Usage
(Multiple
Users)
AP Power
Off
GMM (Threshold: 0.8) 28.5% (4/14) 17.3% (4/23) 8.3% (1/12) 0% (0/3) 35.2%
(6/17)
HMM (Threshold: -10) 71.4% (10/14) 73.9% (17/23) 83.3%
(10/12)
100% (3/3) 82.3%
(14/17)
an unlabeled test dataset which is the case when no
ground truth is actually provided.
Table 7 displays the total proportion of different
anomalies’ occurrences in the Testbed and presents the
detection rate of each anomalous pattern by GMM and
HMM. Here we consider the anomalous test data and
the highest likelihood thresholds of both models (0.8
for GMM and -10 for HMM) that provide the max-
imal detection rate. Detection ratio is determined by
the overall number of time-slots marked as anomaly by
the model divided by the total number of time-slots en-
counter particular types of anomaly. Comparing GMM
and HMM once more demonstrates the superior ca-
pability of HMM in recognition of anomalous events,
while providing unnoticeable false positive rate (Table
6). Among the various types of anomalies generated
for the Testbed, the highest detection rate belongs to
heavy usage pattern, producing by multiple users and
then single user. The lowest detection ratio, however,
originates from jamming channel with low interval. Al-
though there are some specific anomalous instances that
are never detected by the model, regardless of the cut-
off threshold, the overall detection rate of the HMM
is quite satisfactory. We intend to improve the detec-
tion estimate capacity of HMM in our future work by
proposing more complex variations of HMMs.
7.4 Conclusions
In this section we described the Testbed deployment
on a single AP and the process of data collection from
a RADIUS server. We further explained the anoma-
lies generated deliberately to prepare the ground truth
data for model evaluation. We reproduced AP Shut-
down/Halt, Heavy Usage from a single user and mul-
tiple users, and various types of interferences as a set
of network anomalies. We then applied our proposed
model to detect anomalous points, and discussed the
effectiveness of each model. The experimental results
demonstrated that HMM outperformed GMM in ob-
taining higher detection ratio while producing minor
false alarm.
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8 Conclusions and Future Work
In large deployments of 802.11 networks with varying
usage, channel conditions, and operational constraints,
network managers often demand tools that provide them
with a comprehensive view of the entire network. Ana-
lyzing the users’ behavioral patterns, learning efficient
models to detect anomalous periods, and measuring the
temporal performance of the network under certain cir-
cumstances are of great significance to provide an ade-
quate level of satisfaction for the wireless users. Propos-
ing time-invariant and time-variant modeling approaches
and utilizing those models for anomaly detection in ad-
dition to a RADIUS testbed deployment with simulated
anomalies compose the key contributions of this work.
We proposed a new application of HMMs in perfor-
mance anomaly detection of 802.11 wireless networks
and explored the necessity of temporal specifications of
HMM rather than its simple time-independent coun-
terpart model, GMM. We performed analysis and com-
pared HMM and GMM in terms of modeling compe-
tency and anomaly detection performance on the large
FEUP dataset as well as a similar but minor version
of the deployed testbed with provoked anomalies for
evaluation purposes.
The experimental results show that HMM models
are capable of detecting a great portion of provoked
anomalies on unobserved test data set (up to 75% TPR),
and even disclosing unintentional anomalies occurred
during the normal days of experiment. Besides, the false
positive ratio is fairly low (only 1.1%) in HMM that
outperforms GMM both in detection and fall-out rate.
In future work we intend to propose an anomaly
detection algorithm that works in unsupervised mode
regardless of the anomalous information provided for
the data records. Furthermore, we will propose more
complex HMMs to characterize and distinguish vari-
ous anomaly-related patterns. We also plan to extend
the testbed to multiple APs to explore new aspects of
anomalies that concern the mobility effects of the wire-
less users in AP vicinities.
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